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New Perspectives in European  
Innovation Policy
Innovation is essential for economic growth, and governments must encourage firms to increase 
their investments in innovation. Europe is losing ground to its main Asian competitors when it 
comes to R&D investment, and is barely keeping pace with the U.S. Moreover, the rate of return 
on innovation has become significantly weaker in Europe. This has been caused by its relative 
lack of innovative SMEs, the slow diffusion of innovation, and the increasingly competitive inno-
vation marketplace. In this light, scholars and policy makers are arguing for a new approach to 
European innovation policy that puts more weight on the development of disruptive innovation 
and on the diffusion of new technologies throughout the market.
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KEY MESSAGES //
 ͮ More research is needed on the microeconomics of diffusion. Macroeconomic research shows 
that the diffusion of technologies is a key determinant for international differences in wealth 
and productivity, but there is still too little knowledge about the drivers and bottlenecks of 
technology adoption investment. This is caused at least in part by the difficulties of measur-
ing technology adoption.
 ͮ Mission-oriented innovation policy is designed to boost the creation of disruptive technologies 
that can quickly penetrate or generate markets. These policies involve strategic actions in spe-
cific areas deemed key for European growth and well-being. Missions combine traditional sup-
ply-side measures with market creation and demand generation to maximize impact.
 ͮ Technology diffusion could be enhanced through specific policy actions that aim to bring late-
stage innovation projects to the market. SMEs could also be supported in their role as disrup-
tive innovators by improving their access to financing across the European Union. A stronger 
market for patents and licensing would also improve the return to innovation.
 ͮ In its ninth Framework Programme, Horizon Europe, the European Commission puts more weight 
on mission-oriented research and the diffusion of technologies through research & innovation 
missions and an expanded scope of the European Innovation Council. In Germany, an institute 
will be founded with the mission of supporting radical innovation with disruptive potential.
↗
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THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION
Innovation is the largest single driver of economic growth and human welfare. It generates new, 
improved, and more cost-effective products and services. Innovation accounted for two-thirds of 
European economic growth between 1995 and 2007 (Bravo-Biosca et al. 2013). But investment 
in innovation is subject to market failures, which lead firms to invest less than what would be 
best for society. Causes include the uncertainty inherent in investing in R&D, high sunk costs, 
long investment lags, difficulties in attracting funding for innovation, and the limited appropri-
ability of R&D investments (European Commission 2017a). Because of these market failures, gov-
ernments around the world established large public support programs for fostering the innova-
tion activities of firms. 
Modern public support for research and innovation (R&I) took off shortly after World War II in the 
USA, sparked in no small part by the observations by Vannevar Bush (1945) that much of innova-
tion arises from scientific progress, and that the federal government should thus support the ad-
vancement of knowledge. Early initiatives funded research directly by establishing public research 
institutions and encouraged private research investment with tax incentives and subsidy pro-
grams. Support for research and innovation was further expanded in the Cold War Era, and has 
grown more important ever since (David et al. 2000). Nowadays, all OECD countries use R&I pol-
icies to boost research investment. Subsidy programs and intellectual property rights are the most 
common tools. Tax incentives are also increasingly used. Other tools, such as public production, 
public procurement, and prizes, are used to varying degrees (Takalo 2012).
THE PRODUCTIVITY PUZZLE
The figure shows the international evolution of gross domestic spending on research and devel-
opment. In 2016, The European Union spent approximately 1.9% of its gross domestic product 
on research and development. However, the European Union has been losing ground in terms of 
R&D intensity compared with its main Asian competitors, and has barely kept pace with the U.S. 
Despite the efforts of recent years to increase R&D investment in the EU, it remains the case that 
innovations, especially the disruptive kind, have been developed mostly outside of the EU (Eu-
ropean Commission, 2017b). In addition, the positive relationship between R&D investment and 
productivity growth in Europe has become significantly weaker (European Commission 2017a). 
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There are three main causes for the decreasing impact of R&D investment on productivity growth 
(European Commission 2017a).
 ͮ First, compared with the United States, the EU lacks small firms delivering disruptive innova-
tion – the kind that opens new markets and brings radical change (Cincera and Veugelers 
2013). In Germany, the share of innovative firms, particularly among SMEs, is declining (Ram-
mer and Schubert, 2018). Moreover, the innovative SMEs that do exist are having a difficult 
time expanding to a size where they can have a technological impact. Europe’s poorly devel-
oped market for technology relative to America’s hinders an effective transmission of disrup-
tive ideas to established players with the ability to bring them to the market (Arora et al. 2004).
 ͮ Second, the rate of return on innovation seems to have fallen. That may be due to the increas-
ing pace of innovation, which limits firms’ ability to reap the rewards from their investment 
(Jones and Williams 2000). Firms are further driven to race to develop new products by increas-
ingly important scale and network effects, increasing industry concentration and a shift towards 
‘winner takes most’ competition. This further erodes the return on innovation (Autor et al 2017). 
 ͮ Third, technologies used by the most productive firms take too long to reach the rest of the mar-
ket. Whereas the productivity of the most productive firms has continued to grow over the past 
decades, the productivity of ‘non-frontier firms’ has stagnated (Andrews at al 2013; OECD 2015).
It is worth taking a closer look at the issue of technology diffusion. Recent macroeconomic re-
search has shown that the speed of diffusion is a critical determinant of international differences 
in wealth (Comin and Hobijn 2010; Comin and Mestieri 2018) and that it closely correlates with 
international differences in productivity (Jerzmanowski 2002). An analysis of the diffusion of 15 
technologies in 166 countries has found that on average technologies are adopted 45 years after 
their invention (Comin and Hobijn 2010). Wealthier countries and countries with better-educated 
workers are able to adopt more quickly, as are countries that are more open to trade and with ex-
perience in the preceding technologies (Comin and Hobijn 2004). Countries also adopt technol-
ogies faster when their economies are doing well. This is one explanation for the low productiv-
ity growth in the sluggish decade since the Great Depression (Anzoategui et al. 2017). 
The macroeconomic mechanisms of technology diffusion have received further study as part of 
the H2020 project FRAME, which relies on DSGE modeling. FRAME is the first program to investi-
gate the economic effects of private-sector investment in technology adoption and of government 
policies promoting technology diffusion.
In contrast to innovation investment, there is little understanding of the social returns of technol-
ogy diffusion. At the micro level, investment in technology adoption is more difficult to measure 
than investment in innovation, and much work remains to be done. Potentially, economists could 
approximate adoption investment as the difference between R&D investment and innovation in-
vestment, or the gap between R&D- and non-R&D-related innovation expenditures.
Historically, innovation diffusion has received less public support than innovation investment, 
even though firms face similar bottlenecks with each. For instance, investment in both innova-
tion and adoption declines in the face of uncertainty. In the case of innovation, the source of un-
certainty is the economic success of a new technology. In the case of adoption, managers are of-
ten uncertain whether it is better to adopt a given technology now or to wait for future developments. 
This uncertainty can result in unnecessary delays in adoption. On the other hand, if a firm does 
adopt a technology early on, some of its experience will spill over to competitors. As with innova-
tion, the possibility of appropriation lowers the incentive of firms to invest.
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POLICY MEASURES: MISSION-ORIENTED RESEARCH  
AND TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION
In the early ‘90s, programs emerged in various countries to promote the adoption of new tech-
nologies by increasing the availability of information through, say, technology demonstrations, 
consulting services, science parks, and the publication of technical standards. But most of these 
programs have since been discontinued. Several countries have established applied research 
organizations specifically tasked with connecting science and industry and with finding indus-
trial applications for cutting-edge scientific solutions. Examples include the Fraunhofer Society 
in Germany, VTT in Finland, and TNO in the Netherlands (Comin et al. 2018). 
In response to Europe’s shortcomings in disruptive innovation, scholars and policy makers have 
argued for new approaches to European innovation policy. Specifically, they have proposed a 
mission-oriented approach that enables a closer link between technology generation and diffu-
sion and that incentivizes the rapid expansion of disruptive innovation. Both goals can be 
achieved by channeling resources into specific directions that are expected to achieve disruptive 
and impactful innovation and that are critical for European growth and well-being. Traditional 
supply-side measures can be combined with strategic actions in these key areas to create new 
markets and generate demand. For instance, policy makers could act as ‘lead users’ by investing 
in risky but high-potential technologies, thereby accelerating development in these areas (ESIR 
2017; European Commission 2017c, 2018a; Mazzucato 2018). 
Scholars and policy makers have emphasized the importance of allowing the diffusion of disrup-
tive innovations across firms, sectors, and countries (European Commission, 2017a). To achieve 
this, firms must be encouraged to undertake risky innovation projects with potentially high re-
wards, while policies need to be put in place that ensure the adoption of new technologies 
throughout the entire European economy. Diffusion could also be fostered through the imple-
mentation of specific support programs and the strengthening of the European market for financ-
ing for innovative firms, especially SMEs.
Mission-driven government institutions have played an important role in the creation of key tech-
nologies. The Defense Activated Research Project Agency (DARPA) established the basis of the 
modern internet. GPS was initially developed by the U.S. Navy. The German Fraunhofer society 
invented the MP3 and MPEG-4 compression technologies. These institutions are all tasked with 
the generation of new markets through technological breakthroughs (Mazzucato, 2018). One re-
cent analysis showed that German firms that collaborated with the Fraunhofer Society saw more 
growth and innovation than those that did not (Comin et al. 2018). 
These activities are minor compared with the extent of classic efforts to foster private-sector 
research, despite the fact that the latter are not well-suited for supporting technology diffusion. 
Indeed, some traditional instruments, such as intellectual property rights, achieve their goal 
by limiting the diffusion of technologies in the short term. Subsidies, tax credits, and direct 
procurement increase incentives to invest in private-sector research but do nothing to improve 
technology diffusion (Takalo 2012). Conversely, direct investment in research can support dif-
fusion – such as when policy makers require that the resulting technology be placed in the pub-
lic domain – but it does little to entice firms to invest in research. In response to these prob-
lems, the EU has significantly increased its commitment to mission-oriented policy and 
innovation diffusion. 
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LINKING KNOWLEDGE GENERATION WITH  
TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION
The ninth Framework Programme, Horizon Europe, will introduce a limited number of research and 
innovation missions as part of its Global Challenges and Industrial Competitiveness pillar to foster 
disruptive innovation. The missions will act as independent programs with specific goals and time-
frames. Designed in coordination with citizens and industrial technology users to establish a clos-
er link between innovation and society (European Commission, 2018a), they aim to foster collabo-
rations across sectors and disciplines resulting in more effective actions. Individual member states 
are taking action as well. In Germany, plans are underway to found an institute with the mission of 
supporting radical innovation with disruptive potential throughout the market (BMBF, 2018).
A key challenge for mission-oriented policies will be to decide the direction of these programs. Ide-
ally, they should be guided by societal goals that maximize social impact. A promising avenue would 
be to align the missions with the United Nation’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. 
Horizon Europe will also encourage technology diffusion through programs that support the com-
mercialization of high-impact innovation projects. These include the Fast Track to Innovation and the 
SME instrument. Both will become part of the European Innovation Council for Horizon Europe. 
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